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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
It is a general rule that if one voluntarily commits an unlawful act and in-
flicts personal injury he is criminally liable for such injury, but in some cases
a distinction is made between unlawful acts mala in se and merely mala pro-
hibita.44 There are no Pennsylvania cases discussing this point.
Conclusion
The elements of the crime of battery are relatively fixed and certain, the
most recent change being a certain -relaxation of the formerly strict requirement
of an intentional touching. However, by allowing the jury to infer intent from
gross negligence, the courts respond to present social needs and continue to
protect the individual from offensive contact.
SAMUEL J. SERATA
CEMETERY TRUSTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Testator leaves property the income to be used for the care and maintenance
of a cemetery lot. Formerly the validity of such a provision was challenged on
the grounds that there were no beneficiaries and therefore no trust, and that in
any case, such provision violated the Rule against Perpetuities or the Rule
against Indestructible Trusts. In the United States generally and in Pennsylvania
particularly the validity of such provisions is no longer questioned. This note will
explain briefly how this position has been reached and will point up problems
still unresolved, especially in regard to provisions where the amount for the
care of a tomb is excessively large.
It is not within the scope of this note to consider exhaustively the Rule
against Perpetuities or the Rule against Indestructible Trusts. Suffice it to say
that the rules are aimed at the unreasonable continuance of restraint on aliena-
tion which is accomplished by the creation of various future interests.1 The
purpose of the rules is to preserve freedom of alienation, and to prevent re-,
strictions on the circulation of property. 2 In a number of instances, trusts of
indefinite duration for the maintenance or repair of private property not de-
voted to charitable uses, such as trusts for the perpetual care of cemetery lots,
have been held to have created perpetuities; but it seems that the term is used
in its sense of continuing interest, and the real basis for invalidity is want of a
beneficiary.8 Gray, one of the most prominent authorities on the rule, submits
that the rule is inapplicable to cemetery trusts. He argues that the Rule against
44 2 Burdick, Crime § 353 (1946).
1 10 AM. JUR., Charities, § 75 (1937).
2 Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A.2d 258, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1078 (1949).
8 Bliven v. Borden, 56 R.I. 283, 185 At. 239 (1936).
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Perpetuities makes void any future interests which may vest at too remote a
time, whereas in the case of cemetery trusts there is no future interest, but
rather a present interest, if any at all.4 He holds the cemetery trust void on the
grounds aforementioned, i.e., that there is no cestui que trust. 5
It has long been the rule that there must be a beneficiary in order for
there to be a valid private trust for enforceability purposes. The state attorney
general enforces the charitable trust. In some jurisdictions, cemetery trusts are
supported on the theory of substituting the court to enforce the trustee's ob-
ligations. The courts are given supervisory powers by statute to oversee the
trust by their own motion. Another possibility is that lack of a beneficiary will
not destroy the trust, if the trustee is willing to perform, for he has the power,
although he does not have the correlative duty.
The cy pres doctrine is of importance only if cemetery trusts are deemed
to be charities. The doctrine is a rule of construction, its object being to carry
out the intention of the settlor as nearly as possible when it cannot be given
full effect for some reason.6 Thus, it must first be determined whether the cem-
etery trust is private or charitable in order to decide whether the cy pres doc-
trine is applicable. This varies in particular jurisdictions.
Is a cemetery trust private or charitable? The fundamental distinction be-
tween private and charitable trusts is that in the case of the former, property
is devoted to the use of specified persons who are designated as beneficiaries
in the trust; whereas in the latter, the property is generally devoted to purposes
beneficial to the community. 7 It is generally held that a bequest, the income of
which is to be applied to the decedent's burial lot, is not a gift for any public
use, its purpose being purely private and secular. 8 In those jurisdictions where
the trust is considered charitable, Mr. Justice Gray provides a very workable
definition in a leading Massachusetts case.9
In the absence of statute, the majority rule is that a bequest for the per-
petual care or improvement of a tomb, monument, or burial lot of the testa-
tor, his family or relatives is invalid.10 Pennsylvania" and a number of other
4 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES, § 899 (2d ed.).
5 Id. 898.
6 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
7 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Chap. 11, Introductory note.
8 Mason v. Bloomingdale Library Asso., 237 II. 442, 86 N.E. 1044, 15 Ann. Cas. 603, 37
L.R.A. 997 (1908).
9 "A charity in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently'
with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their
minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or restraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burden of government." Jack-
son v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 556 (Mass. 1867).
10 BOGERT, TRUSTS (2d ed. 1942) ; In re Voorhis' Estate, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 818, 176 Misc. 585 (1941).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4 (Purdon 1951).
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states12 have enacted statutes either specifically validating cemetery trusts or
considering them to be for charitable purposes.
Before turning to a consideration of decisional law on cemetery trusts it
is significant to note that such dispositions, if testamentary, are either exempt
or deductible in calculating both Pennsylvania"3 and Federal14 Inheritance Tax-
es. It is superfluous to note that these provisions are of prime importance and
should not be overlooked by counsel when it is decided whether or not a cem-
etery trust will be established by the testator.
As noted previously, Pennsylvania has provided that a cemetery trust is
considered a charity for the purpose of circumventing the Rule against Perpe-
tuities. But it is not to be considered a charity for the application of the cy pres
doctrine.'5 Essig's Estate16 distinguished a previous decision in Neeley's Es-
tate,17 where the cy pres doctrine was utilized in consequence of the particular
circumstances in which the testatrix devised her estate, in that she manifested
an intention to provide for her lot and a church as well. The earlier case, there-
fore, is to be limited solely to its facts, fon none of the cases subsequent to Es-
sig's Estate, supra, mentioned the possibility of applying the excess funds to
the general purpose of the cemetery. The court stated in Kreps' Estate'8 that
no intent could be found that the testator wished to benefit the cemetery gen-
erally. It seems that the court was not looking for any such manifestation
either. Any doubt that may have existed was thereafter removed by legislation. 19
Perhaps the best summary of the philosophy of the law in upholding
the validity of cemetery trusts is to be found in Smith's Estate,20 where the
court said, inter alia:
"Testator is disposing of his own money. This is a right assured
to him by the law, and restrained only by those enactments and prin-
ciples of public policy, which, for the good order and welfare of so-
ciety, have been established by the legislature or by the courts. Gifts for
the erection of monuments and construction of vaults or tombs in cem-
etery lots . . . . have been recognized . ...
There is no doubt as to the validity of such a testamentary disposition today in
Pennsylvania. It seems that the proposition that a man may do with his own
money that which he pleases has overcome the technical distinctions of the
12 N. J. REv. STAT. § 8:2-30 (1943); MINN. STAT. § 307.05 (1941) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS §
13512 (1929); R. I. GEN LAWS C. 133 § 4 (i); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 114-A (1943);
TEx. STAT. arts. 912, 915 (Vernon, 1942); S. C. CODE §§ 9052, 9053 (1942).
18 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2302; Ashbridge's Estate, 47 Pa. D.&C. 343 (1943).
14 Cardeza Estate, 5 T.C. No. 24.
15 Devereux's Estate, 48 Pa. D.&C. 49 (1943) ; Stephan's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 Atd
653 (1937); 93 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1944); 4 U. Pirr. L. REv. 157 (1938).
16 167 Pa. Super. 66, 74 A.2d 787 (1950).
17 252 Pa. 394, 97 Atd. 502 (1916).
18 1 Fid. Rep. 99 (1950).
19 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (Purdon 1947).
20 181 Pa. 109, 37 At. 114 (1897).
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common law, i.e., lack of a beneficiary and the Rule against Perpetuities, in
order to effect the intentions of the testator.
A much more serious problem arises where the principal of a cemetery
trust is a large monetary sum. On this point there has been considerably less
agreement even within the courts of Pennsylvania. The most celebrated case
is Palethorpe's Estate,21 where the court said:
"From its inception this has been an extraordinary case. In many
respects it must be regarded as sui generis. The first and perhaps most
extraordinary feature of the case was testator's attempt to create a trust
in the sum of $150,000 for the care and maintenance of the Palethorpe
family lot . . . . The fund which the testator set aside was exces-
sive . . . . The cemetery now holds a fund of $1,000 for the care of
this lot . . . Any excess must fall into residue and be distributed
among the testator's next of kin. ."
This case has been cited as authority for the proposition that the court may re-
duce the principal of a cemetery trust if it finds the res to be unreasonably large,
and that even in those cases where a large sum is involved, the yardstick of rea-
sonableness must still be applied to determine the suitable amount to carry out
the testamentary purpose.
The Pennsylvania courts have not readily accepted the holding in regard
to excessive principal. In Close's Estate,22 the court said that there would be
no authority for the court to reduce the principal in the absence of statute. Sim-
ilarly in Brogan's Estate,2S the court suggested that it would be a novel rule of
law to place restrictions on the amount of the res, and they refused to declare
a partial trust or partial intestacy. It has been stated that as a general proposi-
tion, the size of such a disposition would not impeach the trust. This is reason-
able, but does not consider the advisability of diminishing the size of the princi-
pal. The most recent Pennsylvania case is Kreps Estate, supra. The decedent
provided for a monument on her grave, markings on the graves of her grand-
parents, and the residue to be placed in trust for the perpetual care and up-
keep of her cemetery lot. The residue of the estate exceeded $46,000. In sus-
taining the contention of the next of kin that an intestacy existed as to part
of the disposition the court held that it was obvious that the sum provided far
exceeded the requirements and that the problem should be averted from the
beginning.
The New York courts have taken it upon themselves to diminish the prin-
cipal. In one case the court refused to enforce a clear and unambiguous testa-
mentary provision.24 There is a tendency to seize upon indefiniteness, or slight
evidence of doubt, whether direct or circumstantial, and read against extrava-
21 69 Pa. D.&C. 500 (1950) ; 249 Pa. 389, 94 At. 1060 (1914).
22 260 Pa. 269, 103 Atd. 822 (1918).
28 290 Pa. 319, 138 Atd. 837 (1927).
24 In re Turk's Will, 221 N.Y.S. 225 (1927).
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gance in order to avoid unreasonable expenditures.25 The New York case cited
Palethorpe's Estate, supra, with approval and applied the "reasonable amount"
test. An Ohio decision also reduced the principal on the grounds of public
policy.26
In a Delaware decision the court held that a fund which had appreciated
$10,000 in 29 years from the original $5,000 res, with an annual income of
$600, could be diminished.27 The actual amount required for the lot was left
to the discretion of the trustee and a resulting trust impressed in favor of the
testator's next of kin as to the residue. The theory of finding a resulting trust
is offered in the Restatement of Trusts28 and has been cited favorably in at
least one Pennsylvania case.29 An Arkansas appellate court took a rational ap-
proach to the problem.80 It held that the better rule was that the courts will
not interfere with the testator's right to create a trust for the care of a cemetery
lot so long as the amount is commensurate with the purpose and not offensive
to public policy. It attached the proviso that it would not interfere when it
could not be said that as a matter of law a smaller sum would be sufficient
for the purpose. It is submitted that there is a relative dearth of appellate de-
cisions on this point.
There is one fundamental argument against diminishing the principal of
a trust established for the perpetual care and maintenance of a cemetery lot
which has been previously alluded to, namely, that a man has the right to do
with his own money as he sees fit. Should a man be permitted to deal with his
own money as he chooses? The answer to this should be in the affirmative. How-
ever, the law has asserted itself in other instances to prevent injustice or on
the intangible grounds of public policy by establishing certain rules regarding
infants and incapacitated persons. There appears to be ample reason for the law
stepping in when the res is too large to serve its purpose. When a testator be-
queaths a sizable amount to be used- for the care of his lot, for all practical
purposes he is creating two funds, one for the care of his lot and the other
to lie in a state of desuetude. The mere suggestion of the latter is repugnant.
In essence this is the situation. If the purposes of the trust can be complied
with, then why should the res not be diminished and a resulting trust be es-
tablished in favor of the testator's estate for the unused amount? It is the rea-
sonable conclusion to be reached.
There are two approaches that have been taken to the excessive cemetery
trust: (1) the reduction prospectively of the principal, and (2) the award of
excess income after a period of trial and error. Leber's Estates' presents the
25 55 A.L.R. 1303.
26 Heinlein v. Elyria Savings & Trust Co., 75 Ohio App. 353, 62 N.E. 2d 284 (1945).
27 Security Trust Co. v. Willett, 97 A.2d 112 (1953).
28 RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 430.
29 Zeller's Estate, 2 Woodw. 191 (Pa. 1885).
80 Hammond v. Stringer, 222 Ark. 193, 258 S.W. 2d 46 (1953).
81 123 Pa. Super. 1, 186 At. 225 (1936).
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second possibility. That case held that the excess income will be awarded to
the estate, if, after a period of years, it appears that it will not be used for the
care of the lot. Devereux's Estate, supra, while noting that the trust therein cre-
ated was dangerously close to being incommensurate with its purposes, also con-
sidered this solution. The Restatement of Trusts recognizes that when a trust is
performed without exhausting the principal a resulting trust arises,82 and has
been cited with approval in Pennsylvania.88 However, this system of trial and
error is undesirable, for public policy would seem to require that such accum-
ulations be prevented ab initio, thereby relieving the heirs of the necessity of
continually policing the trust fund and periodically petitioning the courts for
a determination of their rights. This seems like a more practical solution.
It would be desirable for the courts or the legislature to consider this ques-
tion of excessive income and principal. It was thought that the Estates Act of
194734 might shed some light on the subject. However, it appears that this
statute was not intended to cover the situation.85 There is a definite need for
clarification and general guiding rules. At the present time a case similar to
Palethorpe's Estate, supra, is before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.86 Per-
haps the Court will take this opportunity to make the law more certain and
predictable, so that there will be some standard to follow in the future.
There had been a different sort of problem with regard to small monetary
trusts for the perpetual care of cemetery lots. For example, the testator provided
that the income from $100 be used for the care of his grave, naming either a
cemetery association or trust company as trustee. Then others followed suit un-
til the point was reached where there was a number of such dispositions, each
to be invested individually. The trust companies often discovered that it cost
considerably more to administer the fund than the remuneration they received
for performing their endeavors. It was found in many instances that the trust
companies were unable to perform their duties effectively. This condition per-
sisted for some time, until it was brought to the attention of the Pennsylvania
legislature. Statutes were passed which enabled these small funds to be trans-
ferred to non-profit corporations, such as cemetery associations and united in
omnibus funds.8 7 The reason for these aforementioned funds was to encourage
greater efficiency in management of the smaller trusts by pooling and combina-
tion.88 This welcome legislation has been upheld by a Pennsylvania lower court
which permitted such a transfer.89
82 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS op. cit. supra at 28.
88 Zeller's Estate, 2 Woodw. 191 (Pa. 1885).
84 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2 (Purdon 1947).
88 96 U. PA. L. REV. 305 (1948).
86 Dreisbach's Estate, 87 Pa. D.&C. 392 (1954).
87 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1101, 1102 (Purdon 1951).
88 Grace Lutheran Church Petition, 2 Fid. Rep. 64 (1951).
89 Sixty Cemetery Trusts, 5 Fid. Rep. 505 (1955).
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Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this note to assimilate the law on trusts for the
perpetual care of cemetery lots in Pennsylvania and point up certain unanswered
questions. The chief problem which remains unanswered is, what shall be done
with eccentric testators who continue to create trusts of considerable monetary
size for the care of their lots. The cases on this point have increased through-
out the years, but to date no workable solution has been attempted by the courts
or the legislature. It is suggested that this would be a legitimate exercise of the
legislative or judicial power and it is hoped that the proper responsible people
will take note of this possibility. It has been previously mentioned that the law-
makers have handled the problem of smaller trusts adequately and there ap-




The interest protected by the tort of malicious prosecution is freedom from
unjustifiable litigation. Originally this tort was limited in its scope so that it could
be maintained by the plaintiff only where; first, the defendant had instituted or
continued a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff; second, the criminal ac-
tion had terminated in favor of the accused; third, the defendant in the malic-
ious prosecution action had no probable cause for instituting or continuing the
proceeding; and finally, the defendant acted maliciously in bringing the proceed-
ing or had a primary purpose other than that of seeing that an offender be brought
to justice.' These elements were essential to the maintenance of the action and
the absence of any one of them inevitably resulted in a verdict for the defendant.
The inadequacies of not allowing redress by an action of malicious prosecu-
tion for suits that could not be termed criminal, but which could lead to the
arrest of the accused, the seizure of his property, and even to his incarceration
soon asserted themselves. Professor Harper has pointed out that even under the
narrow English rule the action may be maintained for insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings, since they result in direct pecuniary loss to plaintiff, as well as for
civil proceedings that are accompanied by arrest, attachment or injunction.
2
The courts in this country have also broadened the scope of malicious pros-
ecution to include proceedings that could perhaps best be termed "quasi-crim-
inal." In the case of Lueptow v. Scbreader8 the defendant, a school board mem-
ber, filed a petition informing the juvenile authorities that, in effect, the plaintiff
1 PROSSER, TORTS § 96 (1941 Edition).
2 HARPER, A TREATISE on the LAw of TORTS § 268 (1933 Edition).
8 226 Wis. 437, 277 N. W. 124 (1938).
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